The Economic Aspect of the War. by Verrijn Stuart, C. A.
Xlbe ©pen Court
A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
Bevoteo to tbe Science ot IRelfgion, tbe 1Relf0ion of Science, ano tbe
Erfcnsfon ot tbe IReliaious parliament Joea
Founded by Edward C. Hegeler.
VOL. XXX (No. 7) JULY, 1916 NO. 722
CONTENTS:
PAGB
Frontispiece. Desiderius Erasmus. Holbein.
The Economic Aspect of the War. C. A. Verrijn Stuart 385
In Reply to Mr. Charles T. Gorham. Johannes Mattern 408
Symposium on Erasmus from Several Sources (Illustrated) 419
Richard Dedckind (With Portrait) 437
Mr. Gorham's Reply to Mr. Mattern. Emil Reach 438
The Thermometer (With Editorial Reply). C. A. Browne 439
Water-Poiver Conservation 443
"J'accuse" ' 444
Mr. Mangasarian Again. Paul Carus 446
XDbe ©pen Court publishing Company
CHICAGO
Per copy, 10 cents (sixpence). Yearly, $1.00 (in the U.P.U., 5s. 6d).
Entered as Second-Claw Matter March *6, 1897, at the Post Office at Chicago, 111., under Act of March s, 1S79
Copyright by The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916
PEACE OR WAR?
The Great Debate in Congress on The Submarine and the
Merchantman
Compiled from The Congressional Record by
WILLIAM BAYARD HALE
Price $1.00
The present volume is the result of a conscientious reading and
rereading of the entire proceedings of Congress since the introduc-
tion of the Gore Resolution and the McLemore Resolution, and
of a faithful attempt to make a just and fair record of the sentiments
of Senators and Representatives as set down in the Congressional
Record.
This book is a record of what was said by twenty-six United
States Senators and eighty-nine Representatives in Congress in the
great debate over the question of warning Americans not to travel
on armed belligerent merchantmen.
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
122 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago
Contributions to the Founding of the
Theory of Transfinite Numbers
By GEORG CANTOR
Translated, and provided with an Introduction and Notes, by PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, M. A.
Cloth. Pages x, 212. $1.25 net
This volume contains a translation of the two very important memoirs of
George Cantor on transfinite numbers which appeared in 1895 and 1897. These
memoirs are the final and logically purified statement of many of the most important
results of the long series of memoirs begun by Cantor in 1870. A very full historical
account of this work and the work of others which led up to it is given in the intro-
duction and the notes at the end contain indications of the progress made in the
theory of transfinite numbers since 1897. This book is a companion volume to
Dedekind's Essays.
OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
Chicago and London

DESIDERIUS ERASMUS.
From a portrait by Holbein in the Amerbach Collection.
Frontispiece to The Open Court.
The Open Court
A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.
VOL. XXX (No. 7) JULY, 1916 NO. 122
Copyright by The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916
THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE WAR. 1
BY C. A. VERRIJN STUART.
THE economics of war is not an alluring topic for a political
economist to discuss. His proper task is to study the efforts
made for the advancement of human welfare, and to test the fitness
of whatever means may serve to promote such endeavors, whereas
an investigation of the economic aspect of war compels him rather
to occupy himself with the destruction both of material and im-
material values that is now taking place on a much larger scale
than ever before in the history of mankind. The task is all the
more painful, since when I have finished my discussion I shall
hardly be able to disclose a hopeful prospect for the future with any
degree of certainty.
And yet what Europe is now experiencing cannot fail to
interest the economist deeply, because the present monstrous struggle
is above all an economic one in its origin, in the way it is conducted,
and in its probable consequences. It is evident that within the
narrow limits of a lecture one cannot attempt to exhaust the prob-
lem. One can only give a few examples from the abundance of
details, but I hope these will be sufficient to throw light on what
seems to me the paramount issue.
Before I take up the real subject in hand, I wish to make a
few preliminary remarks. Whoever talks about the war in a neutral
country while the conflict is still raging must of course speak with
restraint, if only out of gratitude for the inestimable benefit of
neutrality. I hope I shall not transgress this foremost duty. But
it does not follow that it is necessary sullenly and cowardly to con-
1 A lecture delivered in Groningen before the student association "Cona-
mur" by Dr. C. A. Verrijn Stuart, Professor of Political Economy and Statis-
tics in the University of Groningen, Holland. Translated into English by
Dr. K. D. Biilbring, of the University of Bonn.
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ceal one's personal opinion about the cause of the war and the way
in which it is carried on. In other neutral countries (Scandinavia,
Switzerland, not to mention the United States) the duty of neu-
trality does not appear to be thus understood, nor in the Nether-
lands either, for here too it is remarkable what many newspapers
dare put before their readers without restraint.
But while expressing my opinion freely about this war I wish
to add emphatically that it is not my intention to inquire into the
responsibility for what happened during the eventful days from
July 23 to August 1 of last year. We may confidently leave this
problem for later historians to solve, especially since its importance
can easily be overestimated. From causes soon to be more minutely
explained it appears to me that the war had to come with a fatal
inevitability, and that a somewhat different attitude on the part of
one or another of the great powers during the sultry summer days
could not possibly have been of any importance except in so far
as on it may have depended the moment when the first shot was
to be fired. In determining this point of time, each government, in
proportion to its influence, must take into consideration only the
interests of its own country, and need not for that reason be re-
garded by those who consider the war unavoidable as having been
more or less anxious for war.
In one respect I most confidently hope that my expositions will
really be neutral, and that is in suppressing my personal sym-
pathies. This is not too difficult if we realize how sympathies
originate : namely, from pity for the sufferings of those engaged in
the war ; from gratitude for the excellent services in the highest
departments of human activity, such as science, art, technical inven-
tions, political liberty and so forth ; from race feeling and other
feelings of affinity ; and from admiration for unimpaired vitality,
for magnanimous unity without party-spirit where, interests of the
native country are at stake and in face of the calm acceptance of
the miseries and ravages of war. All these sentiments may be the
cause of originating or strengthening sympathy. It would therefore
be difficult to find any of the nations now engaged in war that could
not lay claim to our sympathy for one reason or another.
Perhaps people will point to facts that might weaken such
sympathies which in themselves are surely justified. But I think
that in this respect extreme caution is necessary, especially for us
in Holland. Professor Simons has already warned against inju-
dicious credulity, even against believing the accusations against
belligerents based on inquiries by various governments. Conflict-
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ing investigations cannot be held on the same spot, and the psychol-
ogy of evidence furnishes ample proofs that it is possible even for
eye-witnesses to exciting facts to give virtually false evidence in
perfectly good faith. 2 We may leave it to later inquirers to make
clear as far as can be done whether one party of the belligerents
is more to blame in this regard than another.
If, after all, the war has been forced upon Germany against
her wish she can plead self-defense with respect to many things
which might otherwise be severely condemned, for according to the
law of all nations this excuse secures immunity even as regards
deeds which in other circumstances are severely punished. Are we
to limit self-defense to the internal law of individual states, and to
supplement the undisputed maxim "Necessity knows no law," by
adding the words "but must not break a treaty"?
Moreover the two empires of central Europe have so far suc-
ceeded in mainly carrying on the war on hostile ground, and to
some extent close to the Dutch frontier. Therefore the inevitable
misery of war (for it is impossible to carry on war humanely, be-
cause its very nature is inhuman) is charged, with inexorable par-
tiality, to the account of only one side of the belligerents; and just
because the Netherlands have been inundated with fugitives from
the scene of war, they are most imperfectly informed in this regard.
Is the fate of East Prussia, Galicia and Bukowina less deplorable
than that of the regions on the western front? What has been the
effect of the steam roller that was to move in the direction of
Berlin and Vienna, as England and Erance hoped in the beginning
of the war?
Whose heart does not ache when he reads' of the misery in
those countries laid waste by the war? But, however paradoxical
and cruel it may sound, the wounds caused by war are only the
smaller part of the affair, when once it has broken out. I regret
that our great Dutch daily press, by endeavoring, particularly at
the beginning, to turn the dreadful misery of the war to literary
account, has thereby held the attention of the Dutch people so fixed
on this aspect that they have had no eye for the glorious greatness
of the time. This misconception must also eventually make its
consequences painfully felt.
I have spoken of the war as having been brought about by
2 Here I should like to draAv attention to the important open letter, full of
facts and details, which Mr. James O'Donnell Bennett, correspondent to the
Chicago Tribune, addressed to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in Decemher, 1914.
As far as I know this letter was not mentioned in the Dutch press.
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economic causes. This statement will not be accepted by those who
regard the struggle as directed against German (or, rather, Prussian)
militarism. Now I must honestly confess thatT have not succeeded
in understanding this watchword for the war.
If one takes the word militarism to mean an antagonism, or at
least a separation, between the military and civil parts of the popula-
tion, one might suppose that it would manifest itself for instance in
England, where only a small proportion of the population take part
in the defense of the country of their own accord, as was also the
case elsewhere in earlier days (for instance in Napoleonic times).
But in countries like the France or Germany of to-day, where the
national defense involves the entire nation through all its classes,
because it rests on the universal personal and compulsory service
of the men, militarism in this sense is simply impossible. Has not
Germany manifested the astounding phenomenon that at the begin-
ning of the war besides the millions of soldiers in her armies nearly
two millions of volunteers came forward?—a much larger number
than Kitchener's appeal brought together for "service abroad," and
that too in a country without conscription. Nowhere is the unity
between people and army so perfect as in Germany. Annihilation
of militarism in this sense would mean the annihilation of the whole
nation.
It may, of course, occur even in Germany that professional
soldiers, commissioned and non-commissioned officers, on account
of the cruel dangers of their calling, may claim certain privileges
which would not readily be granted in countries where for many
generations the army has had only garrison service to perform. Of
course it is not generous to claim such privileges, but just as cer-
tainly is it narrow-minded to measure the worth of culture in the
German nation by the attitude of a Prussian lieutenant!
And if we understand by militarism the effort of state and
citizens to put above all other duties the one which ensures the
highest possible power of defense, then it is not only an indis-
pensable principle for Germany on account of her geographical
position and history, but one that applies to all great powers. In
one of his latest statements, the Count de Mun3 describes his English
allies as moved. "by noble solicitude for their national greatness."
Has not England, the one really imperial power, until very recently
made the open demand that her navy, the weapon on which her
safety chiefly depends, should be at least superior to a possible
combination of the navies of any other two powers?
3 Bulletin dcs armees, August 19, 1914.
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There is in fact no power above the sovereign state. It must
maintain itself by its own power if it cannot rest on the conflicting
interests of other states. To rely solely on the authority of law is
an idealism which must in reality bring bitter disappointment, how-
ever congenial it may be in other respects. Even in ordinary legal
procedure one does not really take that risk. Doubtless most legal
and other obligations are fulfilled without requiring the interference
of the power of the state, but the very fact that this power exists
acts far beyond its express limits, even in cases where its assistance
might otherwise have to be called upon. There cannot be the least
doubt that if the law-courts, the police and the army were to dis-
appear from a state the citizens themselves would take to arms.
Self-defense is the supreme instinct alike for states and individuals.
The parallel often drawn between the juridical intercourse of
nations and of persons is therefore in reality a comparison of two
incomparable things, because in the former case the impartial in-
struments of effective power are wanting. And this is true for
still another reason. If the rights or interests of certain persons
come into conflict with the higher rights or interests of the state
there are means and laws to make the former yield, as for instance
in expropriation proceedings. What analogy to such cases can one
find in international law? If, for example, the higher interests of
humanity demanded that France should hand over to other coun-
tries some part of her colonies which she may have conquered to
a much larger extent than she is capable of developing to their
best possibilities, what means would there be to carry this out?
Finally, can any one seriously believe that such a war as is
now being waged can be the means of annihilating the militarism
of any nation involved in it? Homoeopathy is usually applied ac-
cording to the principle of minimal and not of maximal doses.
However one may wish that the war may pave the way to an in-
ternationl intercourse based on co-operation, the consciousness of
the necessity for being always ready for war has impressed itself
firmly and indelibly even on those nations where it did not exist
before, or only to a small extent.
From whatever side we may look at it, it is evident from this
that the battle-cry "against German militarism" is but a transparent
mask and means nothing else than war on Germany herself. This
watchword, first originated by England, discloses clearly the real
object of the war, namely, to prove whether Germany, as a strong
and rapidly rising power, shall be able to maintain herself on an
equal footing with England. Viewed in this light it follows clearly
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that the causes of the world-conflagration are chiefly of an economic
nature.
It seems to me that among these causes one can distinguish
some of a general and others of a special character. First a few
words about general economic causes, which are really of but little
significance for the comprehension of this war, or of wars in
general. These are the capitalistic system of production, and pro-
tective tariff.
Socialists who are always inclined to charge the faults and
failings of human society to the account of the great Carthago de-
lenda of capitalism, have not hesitated to do the same with ref-
erence to the war. Now it is worth noting that this accusation
comes from a group which has shown itself extremely combative
in social and national life, and whose system, if carried out by any
country, would surely involve serious danger in the way of foreign
complications. Just think (to mention only one instance) of the
measures against the sweating system sure to be taken after the
war in countries with low wage-standards. But aside from this,
the enormous losses which the capitalists of all countries will have
to stand as a consequence of the war and which can be avoided by
only comparatively few industries can surely prove sufficiently that
capital receives no advantage from war, but only from the peace-
ful development of economic life. That war raises the rate of
interest is an incontestable fact of great importance to all those
who can make newly formed capital productive. But the value
of all existing sources of fixed or slightly raised income is dimin-
ished by this rise.
As to the advantage accruing to those industries engaged in
producing war-materials, it may well be asked whether a state of
armed peace (unarmed peace is as yet only a dream) would not
serve their purposes just as well or better than a war involving all
sorts of risks. Complaints are raised against the undue influence
exerted on public opinion through the press by manufacturers of
war materials. Are there not ways to counterbalance this ? Or
does any one think it is possible for any government in the present
century to go to war without being certain that they have the
people behind them?
It seems to me somewhat naive to put down the four millions
of German social democrats whose deputies have unanimously ac-
cepted the war-budget, as minors and blockheads misled by Krupp
and his abettors, or to regard their French colleagues, to whom
the same applies, as blind followers of Schneider-Creusot. In view
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of the immense increase of power which any government is likely
to gain in time of war, and which even in the Netherlands has
been so great that a purely capitalistic institution like the stock-
exchange has been obliged to surrender to the mercy of the Minister
of Finance as far as its opening and closing hours, the admission
or non-admission of shares and the fixing of minimum quotations
are concerned, one is inclined to look upon the war as serving the
interests of socialism rather than those of capitalism. Another
reason for this is that the war will inevitable promote the democra-
tization of political life in countries with compulsory service. It
is not only in social-democratic circles that the antiquated Prussian
system of election according to three grades of assessment is looked
upon as doomed to destruction on the battle-fields in the west and
east.
The case is somewhat different with protective tariff. There
is no doubt that its object, which is to put the foreigner at an eco-
nomic disadvantage as compared to the native citizens of a country,
increases the chances for friction in international intercourse. Not
without reason does the motto of the Cobden Club mention "free
trade, peace and good will among nations" in one breath. But I
believe that we injure the good cause of free trade if we entertain
exaggerated expectations about its success. Protection has its root
partly in economic errors, but on the other hand also in precisely
those international conflicts of interests which under certain cir-
cumstances lead to war. Among the battle-cries with which the
belligerents have entered the field, there is none to my knowledge
that declares w-ar against protection. Universal free trade will not
bring us everlasting peace; and it is greatly to be feared that after
the termination of this war the system of protection will prove to
be strengthened in a number of countries—for reasons of national
psychology to begin with, but in addition on account of empty
treasuries and the need for national defense. The international
atmosphere will not be of such a nature all at once that the foreigner
will forthwith be admitted on equal terms of trade in countries
hitherto under a protective tariff. Moreover, protection is not the
only method by which to draw considerable revenues from customs
duties, as England can testify. But a protective tariff yields con-
siderable profits to the exchequer, unless so high as to be prohibitive.
Lastly, England will not care to run the risk again of seing her
colonial food-supplies endangered by an enemy. She will doubtless
be able to promote the cultivation of cereals and fruits and the
breeding of cattle in a better and less expensive wray for the people
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than Germany has done by its tariff, and yet I cannot think it out
of the question that England may eventually introduce the German
method.
Lambert, a manufacturer of Charlevoi, in a recent pamphlet,
argues appealingly for a world-congress which shall introduce and
safe-guard the policy of the open door in all colonies as a sure
means to do away with international greed and make lasting peace
possible. I wish with all my heart that this object could be attained
in such a comparatively simple way. But I cannot think that it
would be a matter of indifference to the Netherlands, for instance,
if under such an international control of their colonial trade-policy
(which has been successful for the last forty years) the Dutch
East Indies should be divided between England and Japan on the
basis of a perfect equality between Dutch and foreign importers.
If, as we have seen, these two general economic causes cannot
be made to explain the origin of this war, it nevertheless has its
roots in economic causes of another kind, though not, to be sure,
exclusively. A historical event of such gigantic proportions obvious-
ly cannot be explained simply by causes of one kind. Motives of
an immaterial or ideal nature have doubtless a prominent share in
Serbia's effort to escape, if possible, from the domination of the
Danube monarchy by the union of all Serbs in one great federation
;
in the wish of France to make up for the defeat of 1870 and to
liberate Alsace-Lorraine from German rule ; in Russia's dream of
a new conquest of Constantinople for the Greek orthodox Church.
But in all of these considerations economic interests also play
an important part ; for Serbia the desire to share in the world's
commerce without hindrance from Hungary, for which purpose,
not content with the route through Montenegro, she regards a port
of her own as indispensable ; for Russia likewise the urgent need
for a free access to the highways of traffic which would not be
blocked by ice during part of the year nor lead past the forts of a
naturally hostile foreign state ;4 and for France, where even Maurice
Barres in the Echo de Paris* must confess his disappointment at the
sentiment of the population in the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine,
their re-conquest is primarily of economic and strategic importance. 6
4 The fact that this goal will not be reached by obtaining possession of
the Dardanelles, since they but open into an inland sea both of whose entrances,
Gibraltar and Port Said, England holds in easy control, will sooner or later
be the cause of new wars. Russia's wishes can be satisfied only at the expense
of Sweden and Norway.
5 See the letter of the Paris correspondent in the Nieuive Rotterdamsche
Courant of December 29, 1914.
Is it not most tragic that the French have obtained this insight only by
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The conflicts of interests here alluded to between different
states might, it is true, have led locally to armed encounters, though
the possibility of a fresh war over the left bank of the Rhine was
growing less every day ; but it is my firm conviction that the world-
conflagration which broke out in the beginning of August, 1914,
and which has thrown the human race into the most tremendous
crisis that has ever come upon it is the consequence of the economic
antagonism between England and Germany and of the policy pur-
sued by England on account of this for many years.
The remarkable increase in the population and economic life
in Germany which had begun as early as the foundation of the
German Zollverein continued after the peace of Frankfort at an
incredibly rapid pace. Between 1871 and 1910 the number of in-
habitants rose in Germany from 41 to 65 millions, in Great Britain
from 32 to 45 millions, and in France from 36 to 40 millions. This
increase of her population, finally almost at the rate of one million
souls per annum, placed upon Germany the necessity of exporting
either men or goods, as Caprivi once put it.
Without entirely neglecting the former, Germany has chiefly
striven after the latter alternative, and has taken upon herself the
immense task of conquering the world-markets for her own products.
In so far as the attainment of this purpose was not hampered by the
policy of protection adopted in 1879, German trade and industry
vigorously supported by the government, have been surprisingly
successful. Intimate touch between science and industry, unfailing
diligence and energy, and a model organization—these are the forces
that have promoted German trade, industry and shipping. The
place in world-economics which has gradually been conceded to the
German empire is not due to any lucky chance but solely to her own
exertions.
The export trade rose from an average of 2,357,000,000 marks
during the period from 1872 to 1875, to 8,246,000,000 marks in the
period from 1909 to 1913, therefore an increase of 250 percent. In
the same period the exports of Great Britain rose from about
302,000,000 to 559,000,000 pounds sterling, or 85 percent ; those of
means of a new war for which billions of francs have been sacrificed ? As far
as Alsace is concerned this insight might have been gained in a different
manner. In the Journal de la Socicte de Staiistique de Paris, Hnber not long
ago published the figures of the German census of 1910, showing that French
is the mother tongue of 3.8 percent of the inhabitants in Lower Alsace, of
of 8.6 percent in Upper Alsace and of 22.3 percent in Lorraine. Is it quite
inconceivable that if France had guarded herself against such disappointments
as this of M. Barres much would have been different in the political develop-
ment of the last twenty years?
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France from about 3,781,000,000 to 6,323,000,000 francs, about 68
percent increase.
The British empire, which had held an unchallenged supremacy
in industry, trade and shipping ever since the end of the eighteenth
century, began to feel that a powerful, well-equipped rival had
sprung up at her side. German exports to the value of 727,000,000
marks found their way to England in 1889 and 1,880,000,000 in
1913 ; and whereas Germany's share in the entire commerce of the
world rose from 10 percent in 1886-1890, to 12.9 percent in the year
1912, England's share went down in the same time from 19.6 to
16.6 percent, and that of France from 9.5 to 9.0 percent. The
moment was rapidly approaching when German exports would
exceed those of England in actual amount. In 1913 the former
amounted to 10,097,000,000, the latter to 10,719,000,000 marks. It
is true that in the shipping line England is still facile princeps, but
here also the figures show that the progress in Germany has been
far more rapid than in England. The volume of the mercantile
fleet rose from 4,000,000 to 11,000,000 registered tonnage in Eng-
land in the years from 1885 to 1913, or from 100 to 275 percent
;
in Germany from 400,000 to 2,700,000 tons, or from 100 to 675
percent.
The movement to which these figures testify found its explana-
tion chiefly in the tremendous rise of German industry. Here too
I shall only mention a few figures from the abundance of the
material. I only wish to point out that the coal production of Great
Britain which in 1887 was still double that of Germany, was ex-
ceeded by the latter as early as 1912. England produced 7,700,000
tons of pig iron in 1887 and Germany 4,000,000 tons ; for 1912 the
figures were 9,000,000 and 17,600,000 tons respectively. The de-
velopment of the steel industry is even more wonderful. In 1887
England produced 3,200,000 tons and Germany 1,200,000, to 6,600-
000 and 17,300,000 tons in 1912.
The number of looms in the textile factories in Germany rose
from 4,200,000 in 1875 to 11,400,000 in 1914, in Great Britain from
41,900,000 (1874) to 56,000,000, an increase of 171 and 34 percent
respectively. In other industrial branches, especially in chemistry,
the same proportion is to be noted.
The rapid development of German economic life naturally
brought great national prosperity, and the German national capital
began to exceed that of the English in absolute figures. According
to a reliable estimate the figures in 1913 were 15,500,000,000 and
13,000,000,000 pounds sterling. The wealth of England is still 25
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percent higher per capita than in Germany; hut on the other hand
we must hear in mind that Germany has invested her capital at
home to a much larger extent.
From the foregoing examples which might easily he multiplied,
it is evident, I think, that an economic community with a fabulous
power of expansion had arisen by the side of England. There is
no doubt but it was to the interest of all mankind that this flourish-
ing development should not be stopped, for it brought forth much
good fruit far beyond the borders of its own country. I need not
prove in detail that this is true as far as the Netherlands are con-
cerned. Every one who is in the least familiar with economic
theories knows that if productive energy, hitherto latent or mani-
festing itself only imperfectly, finally comes somewhere to full de-
velopment, the struggle against a deficit in the economic budget of
the world (which is based on the exchange of goods and labor) is
everywhere promoted. England found in Germany one of her best
customers, who by buying 7 .8 percent of England's export in 1913,
took her place immediately after the British colonies and posses-
sions. Short-sighted people, however, thought differently and in the
rise of a new rival saw first of all losses for their own country.
Instead of trying by supreme efforts in the lines of industry and
commerce to maintain and extend her threatened markets, England
strove to obtain her object of safeguarding her preeminence in the
economic sphere by checking the possibilities of trade for her com-
petitor. The Merchandise Marks" Act of August 23, 1887, which
was intended to warn the English buyer against buying German
goods imported under English trademarks, had had just the opposite
effect, for it then became evident that all sorts of goods, which up
to that time had passed as of purely English make, had really come
from Germany. In 1896 E. E. Williams published his alarming
pamphlet, Made in Germany ; and a few years later, in 1903, under
the strong and suggestive leadership of Chamberlain began the
activity of the tariff reformers who endeavored to bring about a
closer union between the mother-country and her colonies by offer-
ing special inducements in the treatment of imports, and by handi-
capping foreign competitors, especially Germany.
These attempts have so far suffered defeat in England in three
successive elections. But their advocates have won many adherents,
for the desire to block German progress has dominated English
politics in an increasing measure.
Bismarck at first opposed the plan of a firm colonial policy and
found the peaceful establishment of commercial settlements suffi-
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cient to secure for the empire a proper share of the trade with those
parts of the earth newly opened to traffic. And later, when it be-
came clear that colonies of her own would be, if not the only means
to accomplish this purpose, at any rate very efficient ones, Germany
found England and France everywhere in her way. In dividing up
the still unappropriated regions of the earth, not only England but
especially France has greatly enlarged her colonial territory, large
as it was before. Tunis (1881), Tonquin and the Congo districts
(1884), Senegal (1889-1893), Dahomey and Mauretania (1893),
and Madagascar (1896) were, added, not to mention smaller terri-
tories, although the stationary population of the mother-country is
not sufficient to bring about a strong, spontaneous development of
the new territory. 7
In the interest of the peaceful development of the world's trade
it would have been desirable if Germany could have secured for
herself at that time a considerable part of this great colonial terri-
tory, which is not least important for France as a never-failing source
for recruiting her army. There now remained for Germany only com-
paratively small pieces, which on the whole were of very little value.
Kiao-chow which has been snatched from her by Japan without
any direct connection with the European war, formed a very valu-
able exception. It was in German possession for about fifteen
years, and in that short time developed into a model commercial
colony. Since 1901 the volume of trade had increased elevenfold,
and in the end it had almost reached that of all the other German
colonies put together.
And even where Germany wanted to open up new regions to
world-traffic, without any intention of making direct settlements,
she experienced the powerful resistance of England and France.
One need only think of the long history of the Bagdad railway.
In 1904 the Anglo-French agreement about Africa was con-
cluded. According to its conditions England, fearing that Germany
might some day gain a foothold on the other side of Gibraltar, gave
her sanction to the active collaboration of France with the Sultan
of Morocco in carrying out administrative, economic and military
7 The French colonial territory (not counting Algiers, Morocco and the
Sahara) according to the latest information comprises an area of 2,800,000
geographical square miles and a population of 34,600,000 inhabitants. The cor-
responding German figures are 1,000,000 and 12,000,000. The rapid economic
development of the German colonies, all acquired within the last thirty years,
is evident from the fact that the whole volume of colonial trade had reached
464,500,000 marks in 1912, that of the much larger and older French colonial
territory (not including Algiers and Morocco) 1,856,000,000 francs or 1,485-
000,000 marks.
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reform in that empire in return for the recognition by France of
England's actual sovereignty over Egypt. In this settlement no
attention was paid to the economic interests which Germany also
had in Morocco. "Without any question the object was to work as
much as possible against the flourishing development of the Ger-
man empire.
But Germany's spontaneous vitality was stronger than the pres-
sure that hampered her f roiii outside ; and when she began to com-
plete her immense continental military power (which has come so
conspicuously to the fore in the last months) by building a navy
with which to protect her fast growing trade and her shipping
interests, a navy of which England could not assert that it had
aggressive intentions on account of its moderate size, s Germany
began to be systematically hemmed in on all sides and began also
both openly and secretly to offer resistance.
Germany has never been imperialistic like England in the sense
of striving after an extension of her frontiers and the formation
of a world-empire. She desired no increase of territory within
Europe, and she knew very well that she could not make any con-
quests outside of Europe against the will of England. But England
cannot permit a rival of equal rank in trade or shipping on the
continent, and especially not if that rival happen to possess colonial
ambitions. This is evident from English history throughout its
entire extent. First, in the sixteenth century, England broke Spain's
power by the help of Holland. Then, when Holland had become the
first commercial power in Europe there followed the Navigation
Act, and from 1652 to 1674 there were three wars between Holland
and England which drove Holland forever into the background.
After this, the supremacy of the French was curtailed and finally
after a series of wars England acquired it for herself on the field
of Waterloo.
Xow Germany's turn has come, and eventually England may
have to settle with Russia, should she emerge victorious from the
present struggle. Naturally England would have preferred to ob-
tain her object, to prevent the development of Germany, without
war. For this purpose she made use of two kinds of currents hostile
to Germany. A glance at the map is sufficient to show that Germany
cannot give up Austria-Hungary, the only ally on whom she can
count with certainty, and whose twelve millions of German inhabi-
tants make up the largest of her various groups of people. To keep
8 Von Tirpitz as well as Von Jagow agreed to Churchill's suggestion that
the ratio of battle-ships should be 16 : 10.
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the Danube-Monarchy a strong power, to make sure of her friend-
ship and loyalty, and to support her foreign policy as far as possible
:
these are really vital interests for Germany. Now, since the Balkan
policies of Austria-Hungary and Russia necessarily diverge, the
German alliance with Austria was incompatible with fostering closer
relations between Germany and the empire of the Czar. Even Bis-
marck could not be insensible to the logic of that fact ; and while
he was still chancellor he saw the first French loan of millions of
francs on their way to Russia.
It was inevitable that the Russian policy in the Balkans, though
directed in the first instance against Austria-Hungary, should react
on Russian feeling against Germany,—especially since Russia nursed
an old grudge against Germany because the latter nation had failed
to consider Russian interests sufficiently at the Berlin congress in
1879. Soon afterward Russia conceived the idea of coming into
closer touch with France, who might perhaps be prevailed upon to
give up her great riches, which Russia urgently needed for the
development of her immense resources, in return for the promise
of assistance when she should be ready to take revenge on Germany
for the losses of 1870. In 1888 the first Russian loan was arranged
with France, and it was soon followed by other and larger ones, so
that the amount of Russian bonds in French possession has risen to
twenty milliards of francs. As early as 1894 this financial alliance
had developed into a political defensive alliance.
England tried to get into connection with both these powers
and succeeded first with France. For a moment Fashoda (1898)
threatened to bring once more into serious conflict the two countries
that had so often contended against each other ; but France yielded,
and soon after the accession of Edward VII in 1901, the negotia-
tions led to the desired Entente, as became evident to every one
in 1904 from the Morocco treaty which put an end to the last differ-
ences. In spite of the Doggerbank incident with the Russian Ar-
mada ( 1904) in which England showed remarkable forbearance, the
Anglo-Russian treaty concerning Persia (1907) was concluded,
though not without opposition from the press, e. g., The Economist
realized perfectly well whither this policy must eventualy lead. In
that treaty, Persia, 9 though with a certain respect for its integrity,
was divided into three portions, of which the largest northerly one
was recognized as belonging to the Russian sphere of influence, the
Readers may remember the courageous pamphlet which W. Morgan
Schuster published in 1912 under the title The Strangling of Persia. It was
fully discussed in the Dutch press at the time.
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southern part fell to the share of England, while the middle one was
to serve as a neutral buffer-zone between the two others. This
agreement paved the way to the Entente with Russia, concluded
during the visit of Edward ATI at Reval in 1908. Lastly the
Balkan alliance lately formed under the lead of Russia was bound
to neutralize the influence of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and
to weaken the prestige of that empire, and, indirectly, of Germany
as well.
Thus Germany was driven into a dangerous position which,
like overpressure on the safety-valve of a steam-engine, could not
but lead to an explosion. A state with such strong natural power
of expansion in the economic sphere cannot be pushed back in-
definitely without fighting.
Certainly Germanv has been a sincerely peace-loving nation
throughout the reign of William II. The government knew very
well that in order to reap the fruits of her tremendous economic
efforts the country required peace and tranquillity first of all, and
so they acted accordingly.
But of course the empire had to maintain her place as a great
power with all the authority to which she could lay claim. And
the blunt honesty—not always as tactful as it might be—of her
sometimes gruff behavior and harsh words, could easily create
the impression that Germany was not averse to war. Thus in his
famous speech at the city hall of Vienna in 1908, the emperor re-
ferred to the Niebelung faith of Germany in coming to her ally's
aid in shining armor and guarding her from danger, at the time
when Russia was threatening to make a casus belli out of the an-
nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although this was but the
natural outcome of thirty years of valuable civilizing labor whose
success is clear to every one who will compare the present condi-
tion of these regions with that of Servia, also born at the Berlin
congress. Another instance occurred in 1911, when the French
method of putting in practice the policy of the open door—estab-
lished in the Algeciras Treaty, but further restricted between France
and Germany in 1909—led to the Agadir incident and the more
exact agreement of November 1911. But when in 1913 Austria-
Hungary momentarily endangered the peace of Europe by desiring
a revision of the peace of Bukharest, Germany frustrated her plan
by sending the emperor's well-known telegram to King Karol,
although in so doing she imperiled her friendlv relations with her
ally.
Germanv has been readv for war. if you like, for the last fortv-
400 THE OPEN COURT.
four years, though we must not forget that only one third of the
Wehrbeitrag (1913) had heen paid when the war broke out. This
contribution amounted in full to a milliard marks and was meant
to cover the expenses of Austria-Hungary's loss of strength through
recent events in the Balkans. The second third, according to section
51 of the act, was due by February 15, 1915, and the third by
February 15, 1916. Therefore, Germany certainly was not quite
as prepared as she ought to have been for the emergency of a
possible war on one or more frontiers ; but no more were the other
powers. However, to be ready for war and to be eager for war
are two very different things. Had Germany really been eager for
war, how is it that she let slip the favorable opportunity furnished
by the Fashoda incident, or the Russian revolution after the war
with Japan, during which, moreover, she even protected Russia's
western frontier against Austria? Indeed, Germany's fundamental
love of peace cannot be doubted, and the same feeling certainly
existed also in other quarters. But since England with the co-
operation of France and Russia had so intensified even politically
the antagonism of economic interests, a settlement by arms was
bound to follow sooner or later, though later historians may possibly
show that even in July of 1914 there might have been some chance
of postponing it for a little while longer. 10 And as soon as the
murder at Serajavo had brought the central powers of Europe into
a conflict with Russia and with France, her unfortunate ally, it was
only a logical conclusion of English policy, 11 directed by Sir Edward
Grey himself since December 17, 1905, that on August 1 he should
refuse (as shown by the English Blue Book, No. 123) to inform
Prince Lichnowsky of the conditions under which England would
remain neutral, or to make a promise of neutrality in case Belgium's
neutrality should be respected and the integrity of France and her
colonies guaranteed. This at once brands as untenable the claim
that England went to war for the sake of Belgium, which has
suffered so severely and was so feebly defended by her allies. It
has been asserted that Sir Edward Grey refused the expected an-
10 Of course there can be no question that Germany could have avoided the
war at that time had she wished to do so at any price ! For this end, it is
true,—as simple-minded people believed—all that would have been necessary
would be to have declared in Vienna that now with Russia threatening to
interfere by force if the Serbian ultimatum were not withdrawn, Germany's
assistance must not be relied upon, and that perhaps the possibility of an armed
action together with Russia might even be expected !
!
13 A conclusion for which three members of the English cabinet, Morley
(the biographer of Cobden and Gladstone, "honest John" as he is called in
England), Trevelyan (the biographer of Bright) and Burns, the former leader
of the labor party, refused to take the responsibility.
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swer because he knew that the German ambassador did not at the
time speak on behalf of his government but in his own name. This
way of putting it seems to me psychologically unsound. On the
contrary Sir Edward Grey might easily have made a promise of
neutrality containing whatever conditions he thought necessary, while
reserving for himself the privilege of taking any final decision which
might prove necessary or desirable in case the ambassador should be
denied by his government.
Thus the conflict between the two nations is based upon the
deeply rooted antagonism between their interests. It has, more-
over, been proved by a remarkable letter written on July 30, 1914,
by M. de L'Escaille, the Belgian ambassador at St. Petersburg, to
his government, but intercepted and published by Germany without
its genuineness being ever denied, that the assurance Russia had
received that England would side with France, was considered
decisive and did much to increase the influence of the war party
in Russia. If these things are duly considered, I think we may say
that it is the quarrel between Germany and England that was at
the very root of the conflict which has since assumed such great
dimensions. From the agreement made in London that no separate
peace should be concluded, it is evident that England has taken the
political lead in this war. For her the issue is the unabated main-
tenance of her supremacy and the further extension of her colonial
empire ; for Germany the issue is therefore above all, to break the
English spell in order to gain recogniton on equal terms with Eng-
land as a great power in world politics and to put an end to Eng-
land's uncontested lordship of the seas.
Can we then believe that it is in the interest of the small states,
particularly those with large colonial possessions, for the German
empire to be vanquished and all counterpoise against British domina-
tion to be thereby annihilated for the near future? Can we believe
that the United States is a match for England and her eastern ally?
On the other hand no one can imagine such a complete victory of the
central powers that England would lose her place as a great power.
And we may suppose that Germany has come to realize sufficiently
well how valuable in facilitating the defense of her own frontiers
is a circle of really independent neutral small states.
In my opinion the manner in which the war is being conducted
is in perfect harmony with the view of the root of the quarrel here
presented. While England has left the fighting for the most part
to her allies for the present, she has set herself the task of ex-
hausting the economic power of Germany. From the very begin-
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ning of the war, she proceeded in various ways to carry out this
purpose: by cutting the German cable; by forbidding her subjects
under severe penalty to carry on any business with the Germans
or to pay them any money; by enforcing prize courts, although we
may be sure that England herself will be the first to abolish the
custom if she loses her supremacy at sea ; by hampering commerce
in various ways with utter disregard for the rights of non-com-
batants and neutral nations ; by extending the list of contraband
goods far beyond the limits acknowledged by international law.
To my mind it is such measures as these which have caused many
sincerely neutral persons in Scandinavia, Holland and elsewhere
to sigh, "If only the building of the German navy had progressed
at a quicker rate and on a larger scale!" The London Economist
did not go too far when it complained in its issue of January 16,
1915, that the international law of naval warfare could be called
nothing but a "rag."
Moreover, England has taken a number of measures with the
intention of winning for herself that share in the world's commerce
which Germany loses, and if possible even more, and to banish
Germans from English business life in so far as they had gained
a footing in it. I will only mention here the release of English
employers from their contracts toward German employees ; the
cancelling, for the duration of the war, of patent rights acquired
by Germans in England ; and an officially organized system of in-
struction about trademarks and packings in which the Germans had
been so successful in the markets of the world.
It is not my task to pass judgment on this conduct nor to
answer the question whether England will not soon realize that by
her own actions she has thus cut off her nose to spite her face and
has damaged very important English interests. Will the policy of
a British life insurance company meet with the same confidence
abroad after the war as heretofore, when it becomes evident that
payments due from it to citizens of a hostile country are now kept
back ? Heretofore a "bill on London" bearing reliable endorse-
ments was worth its face value in gold in international trade, be-
cause it was known that the amount would be paid down in gold
when due. Will not this mode of exchange, which has been so
popular that London has been until now the first clearing-house
of the world, have lost some of its attraction after the war, for
the reason that England now refuses to meet its bills of exchange
if subjects of a hostile country have had a share in the transaction
upon which the claim is based?
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We might continue to ask questions of this sort ; but it is worth
noting- that now after half a year of war its chief object, the ex-
haustion of Germany, does not begin to be even dimly in sight.
This seems to me to be a new and striking proof of the enormous
development of economic life in that country. Formerly it was
often thought that a modern war could not possibly last long,
especially one involving five great powers and four smaller ones.
I have never shared this view, though we cannot easily imagine a
war of the magnitude of the present one lasting for thirty years or
even for seven. In my article in the September issue of the Dutch
Ekonomist, I have termed the possible duration of the war rather
a question of national psychology than of national economy. And
this is still my opinion, in which I have been confirmed by later
experience, unless the new phase of the war, started a few days
ago in the Irish sea, whereby Germany has turned against its orig-
inator a plan of war first adopted by England, should seriously
threaten or entirely cut off the imports to England. In this case
the war might rapidly come to an end for economic reasons. 12
As a matter of fact there is not the slightest danger of starving
out Germany. For a time, to be sure, there will be a change in her
methods of food-supply. It is certainly true that Germany gets
about half of her wheat from abroad and barley in still larger pro-
portion. But these facts are met by some others : first, by the fact
that the per capita consumption of wheat and rye in Germany is
about fifty percent higher than in England, whereas the consump-
tion of meat is about the same in both countries. This is due to the
fact that large quantities of rye are used for cattle-feeding in Ger-
many. If necessary the quantity of grain available for bread could
be increased by butchering cattle from time to time and smoking
the meat, and this would also increase the supply of meat for con-
sumption. Moreover, Germany is the chief sugar-importing country
of Europe ; and now that England, the largest buyer of German
sugar, refuses it, the domestic consumption of this excellent food
can increase in Germany, and inferior qualities (molasses) can be
used for cattle-feeding. Lastly one must consider that huge quan-
tities of barley are regularly used in breweries. If necessary the
quantities of grain available for other purposes can also be increased
by restricting the production of beer. 13
12 In this connection it is food for thought that at the mere announcement
of a German submarine war against merchant vessels the British admiralty,
without regard to neutral interests, thought it necessary to advise shipping
companies to continue their sailings—but under a false flag
!
13 This restriction has since been ordered.
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Certainly no one can deny that the war puts tremendously
heavy burdens and gigantic losses on the central powers of Europe
as well. In my article in the Ekoiwmist, mentioned above, I ven-
tured to find the economic significance of the war in the fact that
it is a sudden, forced shifting of a very large part of the productive
energy of the countries involved in it in the direction of a produc-
tion of ideal possessions for which the struggle is being fought,
—
a production which, as long as mankind knows no other means of
obtaining the object of the war, is only possible at the sacrifice of
the cost of production of a very special kind and of tremendous
amount. The expenses, as far as they can be covered by money, are
borne in the first place by that portion of the income of the people
which the nation is able and willing to spare for this purpose for
some time. This portion is very large in England and in France,
but certainly no less in Germany, where the whole nation is firmly
convinced that it is engaged in a war of self-defense forced upon
it from outside, in which its position as a great power is at stake.
The average income of the German people, according to Dr. Helffe-
rich, has risen from 445 marks per capita in 1896 to 642 marks in
1913. There can be no doubt that it is now greatly reduced by the
war, but even a large portion of the revenue of 1896 will be avail-
able for the state should necessity demand it. Suppose that the
difference between these two figures can be sacrificed temporarily
in the service of the fatherland, this would make about 14,000,000-
000 marks, an amount naturally increased by the value of the requi-
sitions in the newly occupied territories, in so far as these are paid
only provisionally by vouchers that do not need to be redeemed
until after the war. Moreover in all countries the war is carried
on by all sorts of credit, by drafts on the future, which will press
heavily on the economic life of the nation after the conclusion of
peace, whatever the issue of the war may be. Germany is well
prepared to liquidate this credit. The Reichsbank has a far larger
reserve of gold than the Bank of England (108,000,000 as against
69,000,000 pounds sterling at the close of January, 1915). 14 I think
there is no doubt that Germany will be able to carry on the war (the
immediate costs of which are estimated at about 7,000,000,000 marks
a quarter), at least for one year without there being any question
of exhaustion.
If exhaustion should come at some future day, will Germany
14 Even taking into account the gold-reserve of the private banks in Eng-
land and the amount still in circulation in Germany, the balance is very prob-
ably in favor of Germany. However, Germany's allies are much weaker in this
respect than are England's.
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be the only country to feel it? Will not France and Russia fall vic-
tims to it, where rich industrial districts have been occupied by the
enemy for months past? 1 "' Especially in Russia is an early exhaustion
more probable than in Germany. During the winter Russia is en-
tirely cut oft from the outer world, including her allies. Railway
communication via the north of Sweden (now closed for the trans-
portation of war material) and via Yladivostock are quite insuffi-
cient for the needs of this great empire, and transportation by way
of Archangel is available only in the warmer season and has also
but a very limited capacity. The economic preparation for the war
was much more incomplete in Russia. Her isolation from the
world's intercourse is of advantage to Russia in so far as she can
now apply her harvests (unsatisfactory in 1914) entirely to her
own purposes, whereas in normal times they were used for the most
part to pay the interest on the foreign debts of the nation. But
England, that up to this time had not been one of the creditors of
the Czar's empire, placed 12,000,000 pounds sterling at its disposal
as early as December, 1914, for the payment of the Russian January
coupons. Nor should it be forgotten that the internal conditions of
Russia are never safe. She is the only country where the social
democrats have not voted the war loans desired. It was therefore
a wise precaution to prohibit alcoholic drinks at the beginning of the
war, a measure that has apparently been well carried out. But this
prohibition cost the empire a revenue estimated at 936,000,000 rubles
for 1914.
No doubt—though England has been warned from an authori-
tative quarter not to expect an early exhaustion of Germany's
financial resources—the expenses of the war are immense. The
estimates of the direct and indirect costs to all the belligerent coun-
tries together (including the losses in trade and industry) vary
from 30,000,000,000 (Wolf) to 51,000,000,000 guilders (Guyot) 16
per half year [$12,000,000,000 to $20,400,000,000]. These are fig-
ures of whose gigantic size we shall perhaps get the clearest idea
15 A remarkable view (a symptom too that the comparative distribution
of the advantages and drawbacks of the war was no longer left to Count Witte)
is contained in a letter from the French correspondent of the English Econ-
omist in the issue of January 26, 1915. Some figures he gives concerning the
great reduction in the yield of French taxes and in the volume of French
trade in 1914 go, in his opinion, to prove "lunv enviable is the position of
Great Britain in comparison to that of France 411 over France!' he com-
plains, "the workers arc gone, and in many departments every kind of com-
mercial and industrial activity is at an end, while the transport service is*
seriously disorganized. Morover Germany zvas one of France's best cus-
tomers."
16 His estimate includes the capitalized value of the human lives lost.
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if I place beside them the fact that the costs of the whole European
railway system including all construction-work—tunnels, viaducts,
bridges—and stations, amounted to 66,000,000,000 guilders at the
end of 1912 [$26,400,000,000]. And the end is not yet in sight.
This world-war, whatever its end may be, will certainly press
heavily on economic life for years. The mere fact that the payment
of its expenses is for the most part put off till after the close of the
war must lead to this result, as I have just said. I for my part
cannot believe in a rapid recovery of the world's economics imme-
diately after such tremendous breaches have been made in the male
population of the most efficient periods of life, and in the available
capital which has suffered from the destruction of buildings, rail-
ways, fields, horses, etc., and from the one-sided and gigantic in-
crease in the consumption of war-materials of every kind.
It might be different if war materials did not have to be re-
placed. But is there the very remotest prospect of this? Certainly
we Dutch people are better situated in this respect than the nations
engaged in the war, if we can continue to prevent the spread of the
world-conflagration to our territory ; but we too are hard hit by the
fact that a large part of our best customers abroad will be immensely
impaired in their buying powers. I must confess that what of all
the consequences of the war disquiets me most is the reaction it will,
in my opinion, have on the size and distribution of the national re-
sources for some years after peace has been concluded. Hard times,
socially and economically, are before us.
For the rest, I do not propose to enlarge now on the conse-
quences of the war. Reflections on this topic necessarily bear a
very speculative character as nothing whatever can be said with
certainty about the duration of the war or the circumstances under
which it will end. There are well meaning patriots who even now
dream and write of a European federation, founded on the principle
of nationality, that shall emerge as a welcome result of this conflict.
If the realization of such an idea should come to pass the most far-
reaching economic consequences would be bound to ensue. But the
attainment of this ideal presupposes the dissolution of Russia and
Austria-Hungary (since both states are conglomerates of many
nationalities), entailing complete exclusion of Austria-Hungary from
access to the sea, and important changes in the boundaries of these
countries, and of the Balkan States, Italy, Germany, France, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Denmark. Its realization demands single-
hearted collaboration in the service of the higher interests of civili-
zation on the part of those nations at present separated by abysses
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of hatred which can only be bridged after the strenuous exertion
of the best efforts of all countries for many long- years. This
ideal is so far removed from all reality that T forego the task of
pointing out the enormous practical difficulties with which it would
be confronted at he outset.
Let me say only this in conclusion. Could the peace that is
bound to come some day be one not of negative character only
(non-war), but—as in 1866—a substantial and positive one—a peace
which from the nature of the conditions imposed and accepted
would pave the way to a better understanding between at least some
of the belligerents ; a peace which would not constitute an imme-
diate new danger to European safety by reducing Germany to the
boundaries she had before 1870 or even narrower ones ; a peace,
finally, which by abolishing prize courts and establishing a balance
of powrer at sea so urgently needed by the smaller states as well
would contain in it the germ of a limitation of armaments which
would only then be possible—then the night of terror that humanity
is at present living through would prove, though after a wearisome
period of transition, to be the herald of a morn full of promise.
